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The four articles commissioned for this issue of Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology are all concerned with the difficulties created for the process of psychiatric 
classification by the distribution of mental phenomena. I will use the individual papers as 
the basis of an overall evaluation of the problem of classification in the imperfect world of 
psychiatry. In particular, what are classifications for, how good can they be, how helpful can 
they be, and in what ways? 
CLASSIFICATION AND DISEASE THEORIES 
Because it encapsulates the concept of disease, classification is the central feature of the 
medical approach towards issues of health. The division of ill-health into categories is based 
on the belief that this will ultimately enable the rational allotment of treatments. This in 
turn is because the categories are held to reflect inherent processes (reflected as aetiology 
and pathology) that might in theory provide targets for specific treatments. Disease classes 
(syndromes) are constructed when diligent observation identifies groups of people whose 
ill-health is associated with consistent and distinguishable features, that is, specific 
symptoms and signs. In this view, disease classes are theoretical constructs that provide a 
basis for theories of aetiology, pathology, treatment, course and outcome, which can then 
be tested [1].  
Disease classes should always be tentative, and may be revised or abandoned in the light of 
empirical evidence. When the theories based on them are corroborated, as they often are in 
general medicine, the aetiology or pathology associated with the syndrome may 
consequently take over as classifiers. It may be, however, as Goldberg argues [2], that 
psychiatric syndromes are particularly insecure. The strong evidence for underlying 
dimensions presented by Eaton et al. [3] Carragher et al.  [4], and Böhnke & Crowdace [5] is a 
reflection of the central difficulties for classification, which are particularly salient in 
psychiatry: the boundary and threshold problems, and the artificiality of the distinction 
between Axis I and Axis II disorders. Nevertheless, it is generally appropriate to reject the 
theories developed in relation to a given syndrome before proceeding to jettison the 
syndrome itself as unhelpful.  
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The scientific utility of psychiatric classes is complicated by the fact that they have social 
functions, linked to, but separate from, their medical functions of deciding on treatment 
and care, and identifying cases for research purposes. These other functions are not always 
benign (they may form the basis of stigma and self-stigmatisation), but they include access 
to resources in both disorder-driven and problem-driven health systems, the economic 
justification for health service provision and initiatives, and legal processes both civil and 
criminal. In particular, drug company licenses are predicated on success in treatment within 
current classes. Thus the revision of classificatory systems may have non-medical 
consequences. 
CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS: THE NATURE OF PSYCHIATRIC SYMPTOMS 
Clinical disorders (DSM Axis 1) are almost entirely defined in terms of mental symptoms 
rather than signs, whereas behavioural disturbance is central to personality disorders (Axis 
2). While things can always be classified, it seems very likely that classificatory systems in 
psychiatry will always be unsatisfactory because of the way in which symptoms are defined.  
The recognition of a given psychiatric disorder requires that the combination of defining 
symptoms is sufficient to meet the required criterion. Implicit in this is the existence of 
combinations of symptoms that fall short of the criterion, and therefore a degree of 
continuity between case and non-case groups.  This is the threshold problem. It is further 
compounded by the fact that the identification of psychiatric symptoms generally involves 
the ascription of a cut-off point to what is essentially a continuum. Thus identifying the 
symptom of depressed mood requires a judgement that the lowering of mood is sufficiently 
severe, sufficiently persistent, and sufficiently consistent to qualify. Other depressive 
symptoms are similarly problematic: low self-esteem, loss of confidence, poor 
concentration, impaired sleep, early-morning wakening, loss of libido, loss of interest and so 
on. Equivalent judgements must be made about the symptom of anxiety, although, as 
Goldberg suggests [2], the categorical distinction between phobic and non-phobic anxiety 
may be relatively secure. Delusions too have dimensional attributes, and grandiose and 
persecutory delusions in particular shade into ordinary beliefs. Hallucinations and disorders 
of the experience of thought can be distinguished more categorically from normal 
experience, although there are still issues of frequency.  
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Furthermore, some psychiatric symptoms are conceptually linked to the environment. Thus 
judgements have traditionally been made about whether the depressed mood or anxiety is 
a normal response, i.e. commensurate with an external provocation. Hence the inordinate 
tangle over the distinction between depressive disorder and the grief of bereavement.  
Finally, the distinction between psychiatric symptoms and personality traits also involves 
judgements of persistence and consistency, and this makes for difficulties in distinguishing 
between clinical disorders and personality disorders. 
The issue of continuity also affects the identification of recovery and relapse, wherein issues 
of duration and severity of symptoms again apply [6]. Should recovery be defined as entry 
into a state where the operational definition of disorder is no longer met? At what point 
should treatment be discontinued? How should we view symptomatic states that are below 
threshold in people who have previously met diagnostic criteria? At what point should a 
recovered person be seen as having relapsed?  
COMORBIDITY 
Goldberg [2,7] provides a strong critique of our current classifications in terms of the 
empirical status of comorbidity. As he points out, a good classification has points of rarity 
between classes. Comorbidity in the individual case will then be truly informative, not the 
artefact of a spurious separation. However, in psychiatry points of rarity rarely exist: hence 
the boundary problem. Disorders are recognised by core (defining) features, but ancillary 
symptoms are the rule. In some cases these may be used as an exclusionary clause in the 
definition of the disorder, in other cases they are discounted as incidental. However, 
symptoms ancillary to one disorder may be defining to another, thus forming the basis of 
what Goldberg would argue is a non-informative comorbidity [2].  
Carragher et al. [4], like Goldberg, regard high rates of comorbidity as an invitation to re-
conceive our views of psychiatric disorder. They offer an explanation of comorbidity 
between common mental disorders, arguing that it is to be accounted for by underlying 
externalising and internalising dimensions. These are correlated, and in different 
combinations may result in disturbances equivalent to particular disorders. Eaton and 
colleagues [3] provide exhaustive evidence of such trans-diagnostic factors underpinning 
the phenomenon of comorbidity, both between individual clinical disorders, and between 
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clinical disorders and personality disorders. These factors may be more stable than the 
disorders they are associated with, although they too attenuate with time. A bifactor model 
(i.e. a general factor plus the externalising/internalising dimensions) may be more 
appropriate, with the general factor capturing the shared variance in the dimensions. 
However, Böhnke & Crowdace [5] sound a note of warning, providing detailed 
methodological caveats for this sort of research, in particular the possibility of inconsistent 
results arising from sample selection and the choice of models. It should be noted that the 
relationship between internalising and externalising dimensions may be non-reflexive: the 
behaviour picked up in the latter may arise from the mental symptoms that make up the 
former, whereas the reverse relationship may be much weaker. 
Goldberg takes the phenomenon of comorbidity as an argument for rationalising common 
mental disorders in terms of an overarching anxious depression domain, together with 
single symptom qualifiers such as obsession or panic. Goldberg’s suggestion of a more 
flexible approach, recognising the pragmatic value of symptom complexes without reifying 
them as separate disorders, is sensible and appropriate, though it may be resisted by many 
working in the field. 
TOPOGRAPHY AND MECHANISM 
The separation of core and ancillary symptoms in the definition of disorder has been an 
essentially topographical exercise, as has the identification of latent variables. Both have 
been structural rather than developmental: they are generally assessed cross-sectionally in 
relation to points in time or periods, but they are rarely analysed in terms of the interplay of 
factors over time.  
I would argue that it is much better to look for potential processes. The non-core attributes 
of syndromes may indicate mechanisms, and these might be used as targets of psychological 
treatments, as has happened in psychosis [8]. Likewise, if we knew more about the detailed 
effects of pharmaceutical treatments in the sequence of recovery, we could also use them 
more rationally. 
The creation of topographical syndrome categories may also have practical consequences, 
leading clinicians to overvalue what is in the syndrome and to undervalue symptoms that lie 
outside it. 
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CLASSIFICATION AND TREATMENT 
Treatment decisions are essentially categorical: we decide to treat, or we decide not to. The 
process of diagnosis is partly intended to inform such decisions by specifying (or at least 
narrowing) treatment options. In fact, it does so only in the broadest terms. This is reflected 
in the development of needs for care approaches, which are attempts to circumvent the 
limitations of classification in the determination of treatment and care [9,10]. Judgements 
about needs for care are ideographic rather than nomothetic, and become more subtle the 
more knowledge we have about individual patients and the more interventions we have 
available. This is difficult to integrate into health systems that are too prescriptive, i.e. if 
based predominantly on diagnosis. The existence of sub-threshold and trans-boundary 
symptoms also implies the possibility of widening treatment targets. 
However, dimensional approaches also have their problems. While it is clear that 
internalisation and externalisation operate, one cannot treat a latent class. Carragher et al. 
[4] suggest that dimensions may be interpreted in terms of empirically based thresholds, 
but establishing such thresholds would be extremely difficult.  
CLASSIFICATION AND EPIDEMIOLOGY 
Classification lies at the heart of psychiatric epidemiology. However, the imprecision in our 
existing classificatory systems has perhaps had less adverse effect than might be feared. 
This is because cases that just fail to make the cut are likely to resemble cases that do make 
it. Certainly the current classes have been the basis of huge advances in psychiatric 
knowledge in the last 15 years (indeed they enabled us to find out about 
internalising/externalising dimensions). This is in part precisely because they are 
unsatisfactory: wrangling with our conceptualisations generates knowledge. In my view, 
epidemiology will benefit from using both classes and dimensions and by triangulating 
between the two positions. 
TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY 
Classifications are always imperfect. This does not necessarily mean the attempt to classify 
should be abandoned, although we should be modest in our aspirations. Karl Popper [11] 
warned about the dangers of essentialism, the attempt to use definition to catch the 
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Platonic essence of a concept. The incessant urge to revise psychiatric classifications has 
something of this flavour. Popper’s view was that definitions need only to be good enough 
to work with empirically. Goldberg argues that categories (in ICD) should aim for maximum 
reliability and validity based on consensus, and this is probably ambition enough. 
On this basis I think we should relax about the imperfections of our classificatory systems, 
use the information about their imperfections to shape how we evaluate the problems of 
our patients, assess them in detail, and use that information as the basis of the most 
rational treatment plan. Certainly we should not change classifications too often.  
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